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I. INTRODUCTION
When recently asked whether Chinese Muslims aspire to conduct
all aspects of their public and private affairs in accordance with Islam,
a distinguished Chinese Muslim scholar responded by saying that the
Chinese Muslims live in dar al-harb,1 the territory of war, and must
therefore accept the status of a religious minority unable to assert its
* This Article was presented at a symposium on Human Rights and International
Relations in Islamic Law co-sponsored by the School of Law and the Center for Near
Eastern Studies, UCLA, March 21-22, 1986.
t LL.B., Khartoum; LL.B., Cambridge; Ph.D., Edinburgh; Faculty of Law,
University of Khartoum; Visiting Professor of Law, UCLA, 1985-87.
1. The theory of Islamic law did not accept permanent peace with the non-Muslim
states. In accordance with this principle, the world is divided in terms of dar al-Islam,
territory under Muslim rule, and dar al-harb, territory at war with the Muslims. See infra
notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
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full religious identity.2 Conversely, a spokesperson for a non-Muslim
minority living within dar al-Islam -an Islamic state ruled by Shari'a,
Islamic religious law-would no doubt mention the restrictions and
various civil limitations imposed on his or her community.3 Further,
Muslim women would also be aware of gender-based limitations that
the Islamic state imposes on them.4
Shari'a's strict classifications of territories in terms ofjihad,5 and
people in terms of religion and gender, are very much alive in the
hearts and minds of Muslims and those non-Muslims with whom they
interact. This Article argues that these principles of public Shari'a, as
distinguished from private Shari'a of family law and devotional rites,6
are both morally indefensible and practically impossible to maintain
today.
This Article discusses solutions to the drawbacks of historical
Shari'a from a religious rather than secular perspective, because Mus-
lims do not separate the religion of Islam from the law of Islam. The
author submits, as a Muslim, that God communicates through the
social and physical environment as well as through the Qur'an, His
literal and final word, and through the Sunna, traditions of His final
Prophet, Mohammed Ibn Abdillah.7 This Article contends that God's
instructions must be understood and applied in light of all social and
material phenomena He has manifested in the world. This religious
perspective is important for several reasons.
First, Muslims are fully entitled to assert their Islamic identity
and comply with their religious duty to apply Islamic law to every
aspect of their public and private lives. This is a legitimate exercise of
their substantive right to self-determination enshrined in the United
2. I do not have the permission of this Chinese scholar to identify him by name, or by
reference to the occasion.
3. See D. MARTIN, THE PERSECUTION OF THE BAHA'IS OF IRAN, 1844-1984 (1984);
E. WATKIN, A LONELY MINORITY, THE MODERN HISTORY OF EGYPT'S COPTS (1963);
Masriya, A Christian Minority: The Copts in Egypt, in 4 CASE STUDIES ON HUMAN
RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS, A WORLD SURVEY 90 (W. Veenhoven ed.
1976) [hereinafter WORLD SURVEY]; Rondat, Minorities in the Arab Orient Today, in MAN,
STATE AND SOCIETY IN THE CONTEMPORARY MIDDLE EAST 276 (J. Landau ed. 1972);
see also B. YE'OR, THE DHIMMI, JEWS AND CHRISTIANS UNDER ISLAM (1985).
4. See, eg., C. LUCA, Discrimination in the Arab Middle East in 1 WORLD SURVEY,
supra note 3, at 213, 219-25.
5. The principle and implications offihad are discussed infra notes 35-51 and accom-
panying text.
6. Shari'a is the Muslim comprehensive religious law derived from the basic sources,
namely the Qur'an, the Muslim holy book, and Sunna, the traditions of the Prophet
Mohammed. This Article is concerned only with certain public law aspects of Shari'a,
such as questions of public international law, civil liberties, and human rights.
7. Belief in the Qur'an and Prophet Mohammed is the essence of the Muslim creed,
but it has no validity for non-Muslims. Discussion of Islamic law must proceed along
religious lines because the Muslims have no equivalent of the Western doctrine of separa-
tion of church and state.
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Nations Charter8 and other relevant international documents and sup-
ported by modem national and international practice.9
Second, because Shari'a signifies the positive law of historical
Islam, its general principles continue to bind and motivate Muslims.10
Therefore, passive non-assertion of Shari'a's norms is unworkable
because a significant number of Muslims advocate the immediate
application of historical Shari'a.1 The appeal of this movement
makes it imperative that Shari'a be authoritatively reformed from
within the Islamic traditions and in ways acceptable to Muslims them-
selves. Otherwise, such reform would lack legitimacy and practical
viability. 12
Third, although Muslims will not accept secular reforms to their
religious law and practice, they have made some concessions to the
demands of constitutionalism and the rule of law in national and inter-
national relations.13 Clearly, they are sensitive to tensions between
inherited wisdom and the realities of the modem world. However,
8. Under the United Nations Charter, one of the purposes of the United Nations is
"[to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal
rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to
strengthen universal peace." U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2.
9. African Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights (Banjul Charter), Jan. 7-19, 1980,
art. 20, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev. 1; International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 1, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) 52,
U.N. Doc. A/6316; International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, Dec.
16, 1966, art. 1, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/
6316. See generally A. COBBAN, THE NATION STATE AND NATION SELF-DETERMINA-
TION (1970); D. GORDON, SELF-DETERMINATION AND HISTORY IN THE THIRD WORLD
(1971); R. SUREDA, THE EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT OF SELF DETERMINATION: A STUDY
OF UNITED NATIONS PRACTICE (1973); U. UMOZURIKE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1972).
10. See generally J. ESPOSITO, VOICES OF RESURGENT ISLAM (1983); G. JANSEN,
MILITANT ISLAM (1979).
11. The Muslims have known periodic movements demanding the purification of the
faith and the rigorous application of Shari'a. In the 19th century, these so-called Islamic
"fundamentalist" movements included the Maydiya of the Sudan and the Fulanijihad of
West Africa. See, eg., M. HIsKETT, THE SWORD OF TRUTH: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF
SHEHU USMAN DAN FADIO (1973); P. HOLT, THE MAHDIST STATE IN THE SUDAN, 1881-
1898 (1958); Waldman, The Fulani Jihad: A Reassessment, 6 J. AFR. HIST. 333 (1956).
More recently, the movement of the Muslim Brothers, originating in Egypt in the 1920s,
has vigorously advocated the immediate and total application of Shari'a for many years.
On the ideology and organization of this movement, see R. MITCHELL, THE SOCIETY OF
THE MUSLIM BROTHERS (1969).
The same demand is also voiced by a number of other groups and prominent individuals
throughout the Muslim world. See generally ISLAMIC RESURGENCE IN THE ARAB WORLD
(A. Dessouki ed. 1982); J. ESPOSITO, supra note 10; D. PIPES, IN THE PATH OF GOD,
ISLAM AND POLITICAL POWER 124-42 (1983).
12. The Muslims feel a strong sense of religious duty to conduct all their public and
private affairs in accordance with their divinely ordained law. The Qur'an describes those
who fail to apply the law ordained by God as "unbelievers" and "wrong-doers." Qur'an
5:44-49 (R. Bell trans. 1937) [hereinafter Qur'an].
13. Khadduri, Islam and the Modern Law of Nations, 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 358 (1956);
G. JANSEN, supra note 10, ch. 7; D. PIPES, supra note 11, at 52.
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such concessions are limited and temporary because the division of
loyalty between tradition, on the one hand, and a pressing sense of
fairness and practicability, on the other hand, creates a dangerous
ambivalence in Muslim attitudes and policies.14
To resolve this paradox and secure modem advances, modem
Muslims must settle these tensions with reference to resources avail-
able within their own traditions. Otherwise, they will continue an
unstable situation of subscribing to an unrealistic ideal of Shari'a while
attempting to conduct their affairs in accordance with secular norms
and institutions.
To summarize, this Article argues that, for Islamic states, smooth
and successful transition to complete secularism is neither likely nor
desirable because Muslims are obligated to live in accordance with
Islamic law.15 Fulfilling that obligation by re-introducing historical
Shari'a would be disastrous for international relations and human
rights. This Article proposes that the Muslims' religious duty may be
satisfied by applying a modern version of Islamic law that is consistent
with peaceful international relations and respect for human rights.
This modern version will be Islamic Shari'a because it will be derived
from the fundamental sources of Islam, without being identical in
every respect to historical Shari'a.
II. HISTORICAL SHARI'A: THE MEDINA MODEL OF THE
ISLAMIC STATE
Shari'a is often mistakenly equated with Islam. In fact, it only
represents the early Muslims' understanding of the two fundamental
sources of Islam: the Qur'an, and the life-examples of the Prophet, the
Sunna. A brief survey of Shari'a's historical development demon-
strates this preliminary proposition.16
The Prophet was born in Mecca, a commercial town in western
Arabia, around 570 C.E.17 He started to receive the Qur'an, which
Muslims believe to be the literal and final word of God, around 610.18
Continuous persecution, culminating in a plot to kill the Prophet,
prompted him and his followers to migrate to Medina, another town
in western Arabia, in 622.19 The growing Muslim community, in alli-
14. See D. PIPES, supra note 11, chs. 5-8. For a more sensitive and sympathetic analy-
sis of the Muslim dilemma, see W. SMITH, ISLAM IN MODERN HISTORY, ch. 8 (1957).
15. Qur'an, supra note 12, at 4:65, 5:44-49, 24:51.
16. For surveys of the nature, sources, and development of Shari'a see, e.g., N. CoUL-
SON, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LAW (1964); J. SCHACT, THE ORIGINS OF MUHAMMADANA
JURISPRUDENCE (1950).
17. See generally A. ALI, THE SPIRIT OF ISLAM chs. 1-10 (1922); T. ARNOLD, THE
PREACHING OF ISLAM ch. 2 (1913).
18. See sources cited supra note 17.
19. See sources cited supra note 17.
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ance with the sizable Jewish population of Medina, established the first
Islamic state.20
A written treaty between the two communities determined the
relationships between the dominant Muslims and subordinate Jews of
Medina.21 A similar treaty regulated the relationship between the
Muslims and the Christians of Najran.22 These and other treaties con-
cluded by the Prophet and his immediate successors, the Khulaffa,23
became the basis of the dhimma system governing the status and
rights of non-Muslim communities "tolerated" within the borders of
the Muslim state.24 Similar treaties concluded with alien powers
became the basis of Muslim inter-communal relations, the equivalent
of modern international law.2
5
As the religious and political head of the Muslim state of Medina,
the Prophet had the dual roles of prophet, continuing to receive reve-
lation, and ruler, interpreting and applying revelation to all the public
and private affairs of the community. His companions, and suc-
ceeding generations of Muslims, made no distinction between the two
roles. Under the Medina model of the Muslim state, the religious head
of the community combines all executive and judicial functions.
Early Muslim jurists purported to severely restrict the Islamic
state's legislative function on the assumption that the law was divinely
revealed. In fact, the Qur'an and Sunna did not provide a comprehen-
sive system of law. The early Khulaffa and their provincial governors
exercised legislative functions through itihad, creative independent
juristic reasoning.26 The theo-political Khulaffa consulted with the
20. See sources cited supra note 17.
21. The subordinate status of the Jewish community was signified by their submission
to the Prophet's rule, or in modem terms, Muslim sovereignty. The Jews, however, were
guaranteed equality before the law, security of person and property, and freedom of reli-
gion. For a translation of the text of that first treaty, see M. KHADDURI, WAR AND PEACE
IN THE LAW OF ISLAM 206-09 (1979).
22. Id. at 179-80. The terms of the treaty signified the submission of this Christian
community to the Muslim sovereignty.
23. Id. at 180.
24. The word dhimma literally means "honor" or "pledge." As a technical term of
Shari'a, it means the pledge given by the Muslim ruler to certain non-Muslim communities.
It secures their persons and property, and guarantees their right to worship and to conduct
their personal affairs in accordance with their own religion and customs, in exchange for
submission to Muslim sovereignty and payment of a poll tax (iizyah). See M. KHADDURI,
supra note 21, at 175-220.
25. Id. at 42-48, 175-201.
26. The Prophet sanctioned Utihad, or independent juristic reasoning, in the absence of
clear and definite ruling in the Qur'an or Sunna. However, Muslim jurists came to agree
that no fresh tihad was allowed after the tenth century. See Anderson, Law as a Social
Force in Islamic Culture and History, 20 BULL. SCH. ORIENTAL & Aim. STUD. 13 (1957).
For the view that Utihad is still permissible, see Halla, Was the Gate ofljtihad Closed?, 16
INT'L J. MIDDLE EAST STUD. 3 (1984).
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leading companions, but were not bound by their opinion.27 To that
extent, under the Medina model, the Muslim ruler combined all legis-
lative, executive, and judicial functions. Although the Muslim ruler
was theoretically bound by the Qur'an and Sunna, he was the ultimate
judge of what those sources meant in any given situation. The actions
of the Khaliffa (singular of Khulaffa) were limited by his conscience
and piety, rather than by objective constitutional safeguards.28
This concentration of religious and legal authority is the most
telling criticism of public Shari'a in a modem context. The Medina
model was the appropriate structure in its historical context. How-
ever, it was never intended to be the final model of an Islamic state.29
After fourteen-hundred years, the need for safeguards such as separa-
tion of powers and an independent judiciary is evident.
The need for an effective limitation on the powers of modem gov-
ernment is beyond dispute. The Medina model of public Sharid'a, how-
ever, fails to provide these vital safeguards. This Article will propose
that adequate safeguards are possible within alternative models of the
Islamic state. Although the alternative models are not entirely consis-
tent with the Medina model, they are equally Islamic.
Muslim history itself clearly illustrates that the Medina model
was workable only within its immediate historical context, the reign of
the first four Khulaffa. With the assassination of the fourth Khaliffa,
Ali, and the establishment of the Amawy and Abbasy dynasties, polit-
ical pragmatism and expedience rather than public Shari'a governed
Muslim public life.30 The jurists continued to theorize, but it had little
27. The Qur'an requires consultation among the Muslims, but as the word Shwra itself
means consultation (Qur'an, supra note 12, at 3:159, 42:38), these verses only support the
right to give non-binding advice. Id. The Prophet and his successors did consult the Mus-
lims and often accepted their advice, but they also retained the right to reject such advice
and did in fact sometimes act against the advice of the vast majority of the Muslims. See,
e-g., A. MUTWALY, MABADI' NIZAM AL-HUKM FI AL-ISLAM [PRINCIPLES OF THE SYS-
TEM OF GOVERNMENT IN ISLAM] 667-69 (1966).
28. Coulson, The State and the Individual in Islamic Law, 6 INT'L COMP. L.Q. 49
(1957). One commentator described this aspect of Shari'a as follows:
The Islamic state did not rest on any assumption that the public should act as a
check restraining the ruler, even if he transgressed the sacred law .... In matters
such as the interpretation of law and religion, the caliph [Khaliffa] was expected to
consult the 'ulama [scholars]. But if the caliph ignored the 'ulama's advice or
chose to act without it, they might warn him of evil consequences or pray that God
might change his heart. Rarely did the 'ulama even seek to influence the Caliph
via public opinion.
M. KHADDURI, POLITICAL TRENDS IN THE ARAB WORLD 47 (1970).
29. See generally U. TAHA, THE SECOND MESSAGE OF ISLAM (1987).
30. For historical surveys of early Muslim public and political life and institutions, see
generally A. ALl, THE SPIRIT OF ISLAM (1974); 1 T. HUSSEIN, AL-FITNA AL KUBRA
[THE GREAT UPHEAVAL] (1959); 2 T. HUSSEIN, AL-FITNA AL KUBRA [THE GREAT
UPHEAVAL] (1961); W. MUIR, THE CALIPHATE, ITS RISE, DECLINE AND FALL (1975)
(providing extensive and authoritative treatment of the subject).
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relationship to the actual state of affairs.31 State authorities tolerated
the jurists because they did not pose a serious threat to political power
and continued to expound public Shari'a as a theoretical ideal. In
mutual appreciation of each other's limitations, the jurists and states-
men stayed apart.32
This historical perspective provides valuable insights into the ori-
gins and nature of Shari'a and its applicability to a modem state.
Although Shari'a is often represented as the only valid and necessary
implication of the Qur'an and Sunna, the early jurists interpreted the
meaning of those sources in the context of the prevailing socio-eco-
nomic and political conditions.33
Because of their exceptional intellectual and moral caliber, the
early jurists were able to develop a sophisticated and flexible legal sys-
tem that sustained the Muslim civilization for many centuries. For a
long time, public Shari'a could adapt to changing conditions through
its internal flexibility and variety of juristic opinions. This process,
however, has now been exhausted, and public Shari'a is no longer
capable of adequate response. The magnitude of change from the time
of the formative era of public Shari'a, in the Middle East of the eighth
to the tenth centuries, to twentieth century global, social, and political
relations, is too much for Shari'a to handle.
Modem jurists must not confine Islam to Shari'a. This would
unjustifiably condemn it to Shari'a's contextual limitations and deem
it incapable of responding to changes in the physical and social envi-
ronment that are, according to Muslim belief, willed and manifested
by God Himself.
III. THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS IN SHARI'A
A. JIHAD AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
The early Shari'a model was consistent with its historical context
and was a substantial improvement upon contemporary legal systems.
However, certain assumptions and principles of Shari'a are diametri-
cally opposed to those of modem international law and practice.
34
One such principle is the theory of jihad. Jihad emphasizes the
Muslims' duty to propagate their faith through aggressive war if nec-
essary, until the whole world embraces Islam or submits to Muslim
31. T. ARNOLD, THE CALIPHATE ch. 5 (1965).
32. See generally Coulson, supra note 28.
33. See sources cited supra note 11. But see U. TAHA, supra note 29.
34. Khadduri, Islam and the Modern Law of Nations, 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 358, 358
(1956).
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sovereignty. 35 Under this theory, Muslims ought not recognize the
territorial sovereignty of non-Muslim states with whom they deem
themselves to be in a constant state of war. Muslim rulers may tempo-
rarily suspend activejihad to prepare better for the next confrontation,
but such suspension should never be for too long. Some jurists specifi-
cally mention ten years as the maximum duration of suspension of
active jihad.36
In accordance with this theory the world is divided into dar al-
Islam, territory subject to Muslim sovereignty, dar al-sulh, territory
enjoying a peace treaty, and dar al-harb, territory at war with the
Muslims. 37 Muslims determine the rights of individuals according to
the territorial classification of their residence.38 To avoid some of the
negative consequences of classifying a territory as dar al-harb, Muslim
jurists set very strict qualifications and insisted that they should be
35. Khadduri described the position of Shari'a accurately when he said:
But thejihad did not always mean war, since Islam's objective might be achieved
by peaceful as well as violent means. Thus thejihad may be regarded as an inten-
sive religious propaganda which took the form of a continuous process of warfare,
psychological and political, no less than strictly military. From a legal viewpoint it
meant a permanent state of war between Islam and enemy territory. But this state
of war should not be construed as actual hostilities; it was rather equivalent, in
Western legal terminology, to non-recognition. This, however, did not imply, as in
the modern law of nations, the impossibility of initiating negotiations and conclud-
ing treaties, for such actions were considered neither to imply equality between the
two contracting parties nor necessarily to possess a permanent character. The
nearest equivalent, perhaps, to this situation is the recognition of insurgency which
neither precludes an intention of later defacto or dejure recognition nor approval
of the regime under insurgency; it merely means that an authority to enforce the
law in a certain territory is needed under certain circumstances [citation omitted].
The Islamic state, in like manner, in entering into diplomatic negotiations with a
non-Muslim state, did not intend to recognize that state, but merely to admit that a
certain authority or authorities were needed in the dar al-harb so long as it
remained beyond Muslim sovereignty.
Id. 359-60; see also Shihata, Islamic Law and the World Community, 4 HARv. INT'L L.J.
101, 107 (1962). For a documented summary of the doctrine ofjihad, see M. KHADDURI,
supra note 21, at 55-73.
36. LAW IN THE MIDDLE EAsT 345 (M. Khadduri & H. Liebesny ed. 1955) [hereinaf-
ter LAW IN THE MIDDLE EAST]. The Shaft' School of Islamic jurisprudence set the ten-
year maximum limit on suspension ofjihad by analogy to the Hudaybiya treaty in which
the Prophet agreed to postpone war with the polytheists of Mecca for ten years. For a
translation of the text of this treaty, see M. KHADDURI, supra note 21, at 212. The Hanafi
and Maliki Schools of Islamic jurisprudence argue that because that treaty was violated by
the non-Muslim side within two years, and the Prophet retaliated by marching on Mecca
and capturing it, the Hudaybiya treaty cannot be taken as precedent for suspension offihad
for ten years. According to this view, jihad should not be suspended except for the absolute
necessity of settling Muslim internal differences or in the face of overwhelming enemy
power. See Khadduri, supra note 21, at 134.
37. As Shihata explained, the original classification was in terms of territories of war
and peace, dar al-hard and dar al-Islam. The intermediate category of dar al-sulh was
devised by the jurists around the ninth century in recognition of the extended, if not indefi-
nite, state of peace established by treaty. Shihata, supra note 35, at 107.
38. See, eg., M. KHADDURI, supra note 21, at 147-201.
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applied rigorously.39 For example, Abu Hanifa set three conditions
for designating a territory as dar al-harb: 1) that the law applied there
be apparently non-Islamic; 2) that the territory border the Muslim
world, creating an expectation of aggression; and 3) that no Muslim or
dhimmi (a person protected by the Islamic state) is safe in such terri-
tory except by a special contract.4°
Some modem Muslim scholars dispute thatfihad was aggressive,
and argue that it was exclusively defensive war.41 They cite those
verses of the Qur'an that authorize Muslims to repel aggression in
defense of themselves and property.42 These scholars fail, however, to
take account of verses of the Qur'an that suggest aggressive fihad.43
Sunna and the actual practice of the early Muslims also support the
idea offihad as aggressive war.44 These sources instruct the Muslims
to initiatefihad by seeking out the unbelievers and offering them the
choice to either embrace Islam, submit to Muslim rule in accordance
with Shari'a, or fight.45 If they should fight and are defeated, the vic-
tors may seize their property as spoils of war, and surviving men,
women, and children may be taken as slaves.46 These were the imper-
ative consequences ofjihad under Shari'a even when fihad was defen-
sive war. Religious and historical evidence clearly showsfihad and its
39. Shihata, supra note 35, at 108.
40. Abu Zahrah, Nazaria't Al-Harb F Al-Islam, 14 REvUE EGYPTIENNE DU Dzorr
INT'L 1, 17 (1958). Khadduri states the Hanafi position in slightly different terms:
"[F]irst, the law of the unbelievers is enforced; second, it becomes separated for dar al-
Islam by non-Muslims territory; and third, no believer or dhimmi could safely reside in the
territory." M. KHADDURI, supra note 21, at 156.
41. See, eg., Abu Zahrah, supra note 40; M. SHALTUT, AL-ISLAM WA AL-'ALAGAT
AL DAWLiA [ISLAM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS] 38 (1951).
42. The Qur'an states "[Mf any make an attack upon you, make a like attack upon
them; show piety towards Allah, and know that Allah is with those who show pity."
Qur'an, supra note 12, at 2:190. The defensive dimension ofjihad is not disputed here.
43. The Qur'an states: "When the sacred months have slipped away, slay the
polytheists wherever ye find them, seize them, beset them, lie in ambush for them every-
where; if they repent, and establish the prayer and pay the Zakt, then set them free; For
Allah is forgiving, compassionate." Qur'an, supra note 12, at 9:5.
Fight against those who do not believe in Allah nor in the Last Day, and do not
make forbidden what Allah and his messengers have made forbidden, and do not
practice the religion of truth, who have been given the Book [Christians and Jews],
until they pay the Jizya off-hand, being subdued.
Id. at 9:29.
"Oh ye who have believed, fight the unbelievers who are near to you, and let them feel a
rough temper in you, and know that Allah is with those who show piety." Id. at 9:124.
44. See M. KHADDURI, supra note 21, at 55-82.
45. These options were based on the explicit instructions given by the Prophet to army
and detachment commanders. Because the object ofjihad was to spread the faith and not
material gain, Islam had to be offered first, and if accepted, the Muslims were not entitled
to fight. If Islam was not accepted, then the second and third options would follow in
accordance with Shari'a. See Shihata, supra note 35, at III.
46. M. KHADDURI, supra note 21, at 118-32.
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consequences cannot be rationalized as exclusively defensive war.47
Jihad is best seen as employing the prevailing method of con-
ducting international relations for the superior purpose of propagating
Islam and achieving what Muslims believed to be the just and enlight-
ened rule of Shari'a over the conquered territory. Historically, jihad
was a positive phenomenon because it humanized the practice of war-
fare in the Middle Ages. First, Shari'a prohibited the prevalent prac-
tice of using war for material gain or revenge.48 Second, the Prophet
and his companions, acting in accordance with the Qur'an and Sunna,
laid down very specific and strict rules for honorable combat.49
According to these rules, Muslims must first offer their foes the
option of accepting Islam or submitting to Muslim sovereignty. In
other words, there can be no fihad under Shari'a without a formal
declaration of war following the enemy's rejection of Islam and of a
status equal to that of Muslims or at least the status of a protected
dhimmi community. Once they declare war, Muslims must never kill
non-combatants, destroy property, or conduct war-like activities
outside the battlefield. The Qur'an encourages peace and emphasizes
the strict duty to observe treaties and covenants with the enemy.50
Shari'a also protects aliens such as diplomats and international travel-
lers who are allowed into Muslim territory under safe conduct.51
Subject to these limitations, fihad remains a fundamental obliga-
tion under Shari'a. There should be no permanent peace until the
whole world submits to Muslim sovereignty. This aim clearly repudi-
ates the most fundamental premise of the theory of modem interna-
tional relations: peaceful coexistence of equal sovereign states.52
B. THE MODERN THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
After the bellum jestum, the European equivalent offihad,5 3 the
47. For an account of the Muslim expansion, see J. GLUBB, THE GREAT ARAB CON-
QUESTS (1980).
48. LAW IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 36, at 110.
49. M. HAMIDULLAH, MUSLIM CONDUCT OF STATE 204-08 (1953); M. KHADDURI,
supra note 21, at 102-05.
50. Qur'an, supra note 12, at 4:90, 8:61. As the terms of these verses and the verses
which sanctionjihad to spread the faith clearly show, peace treaties are to be concluded on
the Muslims' terms. See supra note 43. Ideally this would be when non-Muslims embrace
Islam, or at least submit to Muslim rule. The Muslims may also conclude a peace treaty to
gain time to strengthen themselves or settle internal differences. But once they do conclude
a treaty, the Muslims are strictly bound by it until the other party repudiates it by clear
violation. Shihata, supra note 35, at 112-13.
51. M. KHADDURI, supra note 21, at 162-69. It is interesting to note that the seizure of
American diplomats in Iran in 1979 and recent abductions and assassinations in Lebanon
of non-combatant aliens who enjoy safe-conduct (aman), violate Shari'a itself. Shihata,
supra note 35, at 108-09.
52. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, paras. 1, 4.
53. I. WALKER, A HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 300, 306-07 (1899).
[Vol. 20:317
ISLAMIC LAW
European powers came to appreciate the need for peaceful coexistence
among themselves and with non-European powers. 54 During the nine-
teenth century, the community of "civilized" nations was gradually
extended to include the Muslims as represented by the Ottoman
Empire.55 Western European legal norms became the basis of interna-
tional relations.5 6
Although the Muslims and other peoples of the world initially
joined the community of nations on Europe's own terms, they now
challenge some of these norms as repugnant to international justice,
the principles of equality of states, and national self-determination.5 7
Some of these criticisms of traditional international law norms are
valid. Certain aspects of international law must be renegotiated and
improved to ensure world peace and the survival of world civiliza-
tion.5 8 This does not, however, justifyfihad, which would repudiate
the basic premise of sovereign equality and peaceful coexistence. The
Islamic world must address the limitations of historic public Shari'a if
it wishes to maintain world peace and stability. First, the Islamic
nations must reassess the validity offihad and whether the aggressive
propagation of Islam by violence is viable in the modem world. Sec-
ond, Muslims must question whether non-recognition of sovereign
non-Muslim states and classification of them as dar al-harb, territories
of war, can continue when peaceful coexistence is imperative. Given
these aspects of public Shari'a, it is arguable that this system is both
morally indefensible and practically untenable today.
Some contend that the Muslims have already abandoned these
aspects of public Shari'a and accepted membership in the modem
community of nations on the basis of the principles of peaceful co-
existence and sovereign equality of all nations.59 However, because
these principles of Shari'a continue to influence Muslim attitudes and
54. Id.
55. For a brief survey of the process of assimilation, see Khadduri, supra note 34, at
360-72.
56. See generally I. WALKER, supra note 53.
57. See, eg., H. KELSEN, THE COMMUNIST THEORY OF LAW 188 (1955); L. OPPEN-
HEIM, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW 52 (8th ed. 1963); R. SCHLESINGER, THE SOVIET LEGAL
THEORY 286 (2d ed. 1951).
58. C. JENKS, THE COMMON LAW OF MANKIND ch. 1 (1958). See generally P. COR-
BETr, LAW AND SOCIETY IN THE RELATIONS OF STATES (1951); Q. WRIGHT, THE
STRENGTHENING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1959).
59. All Muslim countries are members of the United Nations and are bound by the
U.N. Charter. R. LILLICH & F. NEWMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 66 (1976);
Lauterpacht, The International Protection of Human Rights, 70 RECUEIL DES COURS 5, 24
(1947). The Charter states:
The Purposes of the United Nations are:
1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effec-
tive collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace ....
U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 1; see also id art. 1, para. 2.
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practice today, the danger of Muslim repudiation of the basic premise
of international law and peaceful coexistence remains.
IV. RESTRICTED HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER SHARI'A
Under Shari'a rule, some basic human rights are at serious risk.60
Had Muslims not temporarily abandoned public Shari'a during secu-
lar rule, there would have been massive violations of the most basic
human rights.61 Recent attempts to re-introduce public Shari'a in
Iran and Pakistan provide horrific examples of persecution of religious
minorities and violation of individual civil liberties.62 Islamic govern-
ments sometimes commit these atrocities in violation of Shari'a
itself.63 This transgression is due to a lack of institutionalized safe-
guards to ensure compliance with Shari'a limitations on the powers of
rulers.64 But even if Shari'a is observed, gross violations of human
rights would still occur.
As explained below, Shari'a classifies all the subjects of an Islamic
state in terms of gender and religion. At the top of the hierarchy are
Muslim men, who enjoy the highest level of civil and political rights,
followed by Muslim women and "tolerated" non-Muslim minorities.
60. The important question of the validity of moral and philosophical foundations of
human rights is beyond the scope of this Article.
61. For example, it should be noted that slavery has been abolished in the Muslim
world as a matter of secular law and not through the reform of the relevant rules of Shari'a.
Despite the call to formally abolish slavery as a matter of Shari'a law, see A. ALl, supra
note 17, at 267, abolition was achieved only through secular law.
In theory, there is nothing to prevent the re-establishment of slavery if Shari'a is the
exclusive legal system. For Shari'a's effort to improve the lot of the slaves, see M. KHAD-
DURI, supra note 21, at 130-32. Nevertheless, slavery as such is not unlawful under Shari'a.
62. Documenting current human rights violations is problematic because of the scar-
city of objective and verifiable information. Moreover, it is often difficult to distinguish
between the various sociological and political causes in relation to a given country. The
available information nevertheless provides support for the statement that certain human
rights violations are at least closely associated with the application of Shari'a law in Iran
and Pakistan. This is particularly true when the frequent incidence and gravity of such
violations coincide with the move to apply Shari'a in these countries. See, e.g., AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL, LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN: A
REPORT COVERING THE EVENTS WITHIN THE SEVEN MONTHS PERIOD FOLLOWING THE
REVOLUTION OF FEBRUARY 1979 (1980); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, DOCUMENTATION
ON IRAN (1982); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, EVIDENCE OF TORTURE IN IRAN, (1984).
In relation to Pakistan, see AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF
PAKISTAN: AN AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT INCLUDING THE FINDINGS OF A
MISSION TO PAKISTAN, 23 April-12 May 1976 (1977); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, SHORT
REPORT OF AN AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL MISSION TO THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKI-
STAN, 20-25 January 1978 (1978).
63. The scope of the present Article does not permit a detailed discussion of the various
sociological, political, and economic reasons why the Muslims are plagued by oppressive
authoritarian regimes that exploit and manipulate Shari'a in this way. It is significant for
the purposes of this Article to note that historical public Shari'a lends itself to such
exploitation and manipulation.
64. See supra notes 23-31 and accompanying text.
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Shari'a treats aliens who are admitted under temporary safe conduct
(aman) under the terms of their license, unless their stay in the Mus-
lim state is an extended one, whereupon they are treated as members
of a tolerated non-Muslim community (dhimmi). 65 None of the sub-
jects of a Shari'a state, including Muslim men, enjoy the full rights of a
citizen in the modem sense of the term.66
This Article now analyzes the human rights of various groups
under the Muslim's historical development of Shari'a as positive law.
As will be made clear, historical Shari'a did not provide for constitu-
tional civil rights and safeguards limiting the power and discretion of
its rulers. The Qur'an and Sunna do provide sources that support the
development of constitutional safeguards today,67 but these sources
have yet to be developed into positive law.
A. MUSLIM MEN
Under traditional Shari'a, the Muslim male enjoyed full civil
capacity, but his political rights fell short of modem standards. He
had no effective voice in government because Shari'a did not provide
for the popular election of rulers.68 As evidenced by the history of the
Khulaffa, the executive heads of state, Shari'a made no provision for
65. Shihata, supra note 35, at 108 (citing AL-MAwARDI, AL-AHKHAM AL
SULTANIYYA [THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT] 252 (1853)).
66. Khadduri states:
Human Rights in Islam, as prescribed by the Divine Law [Shari'a], are privileges
only of persons of full legal capacity. A person with full legal capacity is a living
human of mature age, free, and of Moslem faith. It follows accordingly, that non-
Moslems and slaves who lived in the Islamic states were only partially protected by
law or had no legal capacity at all.
Khadduri, Human Rights in Islam, 243 ANNUALS 77, 79 (1946). This substantially true
statement should be qualified in two ways. First, the rights of a Muslim male who enjoyed
full capacity as prescribed by Shari'a do not exactly correspond to the full rights of a
citizen in the modem sense of the term. Second, Muslim women did not enjoy civil and
political rights equal to those of Muslim men. There is also a distinction between Islam
and the "Divine law," by which I take Khadduri to be referring to Shari'a. An apprecia-
tion of the fact that Shari'a did not enact into positive law the whole of Islam is crucial to
the reform methodology proposed at the end of this Article.
67. See generally Ishaque, Al-A hkam Al-Sultanivah: Law of Government in Islam, 4
ISLAMIC STUD. 275 (1965); M. ASAD, PRINCIPLES OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT IN
ISLAM (1966).
68. Popular elections were utterly unthinkable in the seventh century A.D., which is
precisely the point. So long as the manner of succession of the first four Khulaffa, a mix-
ture of selection by leading Muslims and direct appointment by the preceding Khaliffa, is
taken as definitive and the most authoritative Islamic model, we cannot say that Shari'a
provides for general elections on universal suffrage.
For the Shi'a sect of Islam, the office of Khaliffa (Imam in their terminology) is deter-
mined by direct descent from the Prophet and appointment by the preceding Imam. For
the majority of Shi'a, known as Twelvers, now living mainly in Iran, there is no question of
any election of the Imam. Note that these Shi'a believe that the current incumbent Imam
is absent and expected to reappear soon.
On the majority Sunni and minority Shi'a views on the selection of the executive head of
the state, see LAW IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 36, chs. 1 and 5.
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peaceful and orderly change of government.6 9 Similarly, Shari'a pro-
vided no effective limitations on the powers of the ruler.70
Islamic law, as developed by the early jurists, does allow Muslim
male community leaders to advise the ruler, although they cannot
compel him to comply. 71 The ruler may impose criminal sanctions for
dissent at his complete discretion. 72 These sanctions dampen freedom
of speech and create a sense of intellectual and political impotence. 73
Furthermore, if Muslim men express views that the ruler deems heret-
ical, they may be put to death as apostates.74
B. MUSLIM WOMEN AND NON-MUSLIMS
Women and tolerated communities of non-Muslims suffer more
restrictions than Muslim men. Shari'a does not allow either group to
advise the ruler or participate on equal terms with Muslim men in the
public life of the Muslim state.
Shari'a treats women as the wards of men. As such, women lack
the capacity to hold high-ranking general executive or judicial office.75
While Shari'a achieved significant advances over contemporary prac-
tice in improving the status of women,76 it generally inhibits women's
69. See sources cited supra note 30.
70. See sources cited supra note 28.
71. See sources cited supra note 28.
72. Islamic criminal law provides for a few specific offenses and punishments, hudud
and qasas, and leaves the rest to the discretion of the ruler. See generally M. EL-AWA,
PUNISHMENT IN ISLAMIC LAW (1982).
73. Khadduri states this aspect of the Muslim historical experience as follows:
While, in early Islam, Muslim public opinion was not inclined to support an imam
[Khaliffa] who himself seemed to have departed from the law, the jurist-theolo-
gians seem to have gradually tended to support the authority of the imam against
any element revolting against him. They upheld the theory that the imam, even if
he committed an error, must be obeyed. The Ash'aris and almost all the latter
Sunni jurists supported authority against dissension and argued that rebellion is
worse than tyranny. To them once the bay'a (homage or fealty) was given to the
new imam there was no legal way of taking it back.... Thus in practice the imam
has the ultimate authority in the state, and he can invoke thefihad to enforce his
commands. It follows that baghi, in the sense of dissension, would constitute the
negation of the imam's authority; hence both the imam and his subject must
oppose the dissenters in order to re-establish the unity of the imamate [leadership
of the Muslim community].
M. KHADDURI, supra note 21, at 78-79.
74. See eg., Peters & DeVries, Apostasy in Islam, 17 DIE WELT DE ISLAMS 1 (1976).
For a modem application of this law in the Sudan in 1985, see An-Na'im, The Islamic Law
of Apostasy and its Modem Applicability: A Case from the Sudan, 16 RELIGION 197 (1986).
75. See Qur'an, supra note 12, at 2:282; 4:34, 33:33, 33:53. For a general explanation of
wilaya, the male guardianship over women, see SHORTER ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISLAM 633
(H. Gibb & J. Kramers, eds. 1953) [hereinafter ENCYCLOPEDIA] (stating that the sover-
eigu's power he holds or delegates is willaya. Holders of high or judicial office have a
special willaya. Women are excluded from possessing either general or special willaya).
76. See A. ALI, supra note 17, at 255-57; P. Hrrrl, HISTORY OF THE ARAB 28 (1956);
R. LEVY, THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF ISLAM 91-134 (1957); R. SMITH, KINSHIP AND
MARRIAGE IN EARLY ARABIA 92-94 (1903).
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participation in public life.77
Non-Muslims suffer limitations on their access to public offices
that exercise authority over Muslims because their allegiance to the
Muslim state is in doubt. Shari'a allows them a degree of communal
autonomy and power to conduct the private affairs of their religious
community,78 but they may not hold responsible office or join the mili-
tary service of the Islamic state.79 In exchange for being dhimmis, a
tolerated community governed and defended by the Muslims, non-
Muslims payjizia, a personal poll-tax that signifies submission to Mus-
lim rule and sovereignty. 80
Some modem Muslim scholars justify the payment of jizia
because non-Muslims are exempt from military service and should
therefore share in the cost of defending the realm.81 The truth of the
matter, however, is that they are disqualified, and not merely exempt,
from military service. Exemption implies request or at least the choice
of the person excused. Non-Muslims have no choice in accepting the
status of being defended by the Muslims in exchange for payment of
jizia.82
It must be emphasized that the object of critically noting all these
limitations on the basic civil rights of Muslim men, women, and non-
Muslims is not to doubt the validity of such limitations in their proper
historical context. Sharia's view of civil liberties compared favorably
with civil rights under Roman and Persian law prevailing at the time.
Rather, criticism and strong objection must be raised to any attempt
to reintroduce historical public Shari'a today because it is inconsistent
with prevailing human rights standards.
77. See Higgins, Women in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Legal, Social, and Ideological
Changes, 10 SIGNS: J. WOMEN IN CULTURE & Soc'y 477 (1985).
78. On the degree of internal autonomy allowed to dhimmis, see Goiten, Minority Self-
Rule and Government Control in Islam, 31 STUD. ISLAMICA 101 (1970).
79. This restriction was done under charters granted by the Muslim state to its non-
Muslim subjects called "compacts of dhimma." For samples of the terms of these charters,
see M. KHADDURI, supra note 21, at 177-78; see also ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 75, at 16-
17, 75-76.
80. The concept of dhimma is not, of course, a purely legal concept, but rather a social
and political institution based on religio-legal principles. See A. TRrrTON, THE CALIPHS
AND THEIR NoN-MuSLIM SUBJECTS (1970) (providing an extensive review of the institu-
tion and its implications throughout Muslim history).
81. M. HAMIDULLAH, MUSLIM CONDUCT OF STATE 244-45 (1968).
82. T. ARNOLD, THE PREACHING OF ISLAM (1913). Arnold gives several examples of
Christian groups who were exempt from payment ofjizia in exchange for serving in Muslim
armies. Id. at 62-63. This occurence was rather exceptional and contrary to the predomi-
nant practice. Such positive features of the historical Muslim experience should be empha-
sized and developed further into complete equality between the citizens of an Islamic state,
regardless of sex or religion.
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C. SHARi'A IN LIGHT OF MINIMUM HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS
While this Article criticizes historical public Shari'a as being
inconsistent with prevailing human rights standards, it does not
unqualifiedly endorse those standards that originated within the west-
em liberal tradition.83 As in the case of international law,84 the emer-
gence of the socialist and third world blocs has already had a
significant impact in reformulating human rights standards.8 5 Eco-
nomic, social, cultural, and collective peoples' rights such as a right to
development are increasingly finding expression in United Nations
documents and in regional human rights instruments.8 6 Claims of cul-
tural relativism are gradually modifying the definition and implemen-
tation of human rights.
This line of development does not negate the validity of the objec-
tions raised against public Shari'a. Claims of cultural relativism,
including allegiance to a religious legal system such as Shari'a, are
limited by minimum standards of universal human rights.87 For
example, slavery and torture cannot be justified with reference to any
set of prevailing social norms or traditional cultural standards. To
concede the unlimited claims of an ideological or cultural tradition
can lead to absurd and manifestly unjust results.
Discrimination on grounds of gender or religion is as objectiona-
ble as discrimination on grounds of race.88 The Muslims condemn the
racist policies of the Republic of South Africa, for example, while con-
doning discrimination on grounds of gender and religion under their
own law. Furthermore, the modem nation state is based on the funda-
mental premise of equal rights and duties for all its citizens, which are
83. See F. DOWRICK, HUMAN RIGHTS, PROBLEMS, PERSPECTIVES AND TEXTS
(1979); A. ROBERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD (1982); Minogue, The History of
the Idea of Human Rights, in THE HUMAN RIGHTS READER 3 (W. Laqueur & B. Rubin
eds. 1978); Van Dervyver, The Concept of Human Rights: Its History, Contents and Mean-
ing, in AcrA JURIDICA 10 (1979).
84. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
85. For a general survey of this process, see Henkin, Rights: Here and There, 81
COLUM. L. REv. 1582 (1981). For the Marxist perspective, see, e.g., Przetacznik, The
Socialist Concept of Human Rights: Its Philosophical Background and Political Justifica.
tion, 13 REVUE BELGE DE DROIT INT'L 238 (1977).
86. See generally International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 9;
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 9; African
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, supra note 9; American Convention on Human
Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, at 1, O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.23, doc.
21, rev. 6.
87. See An-Na'im, Religious Minorities under Islamic Law and the Limits of Cultural
Relativism, 9 HUM. RTS. Q. 1 (1987).
88. It is not being claimed here that current state practice is fully consistent with these
standards. However, the effective prohibition of discrimination on grounds of race, gender,
or religion is one of the objectives of the international human rights movement. A discus-
sion of the moral and philosophical base of these standards is beyond the scope of this
Article.
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often enshrined in formal constitutional documents. 89 Thus a modem
Islamic state cannot justify discrimination among its own citizens on
grounds of gender or religion.
Muslim scholars do not justify such discrimination as a matter of
principle.90 Rather, Muslim writings are apologetic and uncritical.91
If the Muslims are seriously contemplating the application of an
Islamic public law to replace or at least supplement the secular West-
ern model they inherited from colonial rule, they must meet the chal-
lenge of modem international law and basic universal human rights.
V. SOLUTIONS FROM WITHIN ISLAM
A legitimate and lasting constitutional and legal order that can
address modem international relations and domestic human rights
must develop from within Islam. Although Muslims presently live
with superficial patterns of western-style government, Muslim belief
precludes a purely secular approach to law and state.92
Therefore, the benefits of western secularism in the Muslim world
are temporary. Islamic states lack native support for western govern-
mental institutions because these institutions are perceived as purely
secular and un-Islamic.93 Furthermore, despite western-style constitu-
tional safeguards and international obligations regarding human
rights, massive violations continue to occur in the region.94
The movement among some Muslim jurists to re-institute the
Medina model of historical public Shari'a may be seen, in at least one
sense, as a positive step. Islamic fundamentalism confronts Muslims
with the implications of Shari'a in a modem context, and forces them
to conceive of alternative Islamic responses.
It is impossible to reconcile every aspect of historical public
Shari'a with the full range of domestic civil liberties and peaceful co-
89. Most modem Muslim countries have written constitutions that expressly guarantee
equality before the law for all citizens. This is true not only of the secular Muslim states,
but also of the states that purport to apply Shari'a. See CONST. OF THE ISLAMIC REPUB-
LIC OF IRAN art. 20; CONST. OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN arts. 25-27; CONST.
OF THE REPUBLIC OF SUDAN art. 14. The Iranian constitution nevertheless makes provi-
sion for discrimination on grounds of religion. CONST. OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF
IRAN arts. 11-14. See generally CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (A.
Beaustein & G. Flanz ed. 1985).
90. Works such as S. Tabandeh, A MUSLIM COMMENTARY ON THE UNIVERSAL DEC-
LARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1970) are exceptional in this regard.
91. For a critical review of modem Muslim reformist movements see, for example, M.
KERR, ISLAMIC REFORM (1966); FAZLUR RAHMAN, ISLAM, ch. 13 (1966); W. SMITH,
ISLAM IN MODERN HISTORY (1957).
92. See sources cited supra note 11.
93. See sources cited supra note 11.
94. See generally sources cited supra note 3.
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existence in the international sphere. 95
The best solution to the current Muslim dilemma of legitimizing
peaceful coexistence and basic human rights from within Islam is
based on the work of the late Sudanese Muslim reformer Ustadh Mah-
moud Mohamed Taha.96 According to Taha, public Shari'a did not
enact the whole of Islam. 97 The jurists were working primarily on the
model of the Medina state and speculating on the basis of their knowl-
edge and understanding of the Qur'an and Sunna.98 Both the Medina
model and the jurists' understanding of the sources were bound to
their historical context. One may find the modern model of an Islamic
state in the broad principles of justice and equality contained in the
Qur'an and Sunna of the earlier stage of Mecca before migration to
Medina.99
Taha's approach provides a framework for the discovery of solu-
tions from within Islam. Such a model would emphasize that Islam
suits all ages and places, not just its early historical context. Muslims
must recall that the Prophet was a man of his time and for all times.
In delivering the whole of the Qur'an and living up to its values, the
Prophet faithfully executed his role as the Prophet of the universal and
eternal message of Islam. Working out of the totality of Islam, the
Prophet then constructed the best workable model and left the rest for
the Muslims to develop and implement in light of their own needs and
experience. Thus, Islam suits all ages and places by providing a flexi-
ble framework from which the right answers may be developed
according to the demands of the times.
There are some major obstacles to instituting the framework this
Article proposes. First, such changes require Muslims to encourage
free discussion and tolerate political dissent. However, the prevailing
attitudes inherited from Shari'a do not tolerate unorthodoxy or dis-
sent. 1°° Most Muslim scholars are either silent, in exile, or in
prison. 10 1 For example, Sheikh Ali Abdel Razig of Cairo's Al Azhar
Islamic University suffered severe persecution after publication of his
95. See supra notes 16-82 and accompanying text.
96. All Taha's books are in Arabic. For a new English translation, see M. TAHA, THE
SECOND MESSAGE OF ISLAM (A. An-Naim trans. 1987). For an explanation of some
aspects of Taha's approach, see An-Na'im, supra note 74; An-Na'im, The Elusive Islamic
Constitution: The Sudanese Experience, 26 ORIENT 329 (1985); El Naiem, A Modern
Approach to Human Rights in Islam: Foundations and Implications for Africa, in HUMAN
RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 75 (C. Welch & R. Meltzer eds. 1984).
97. See generally M. TAHA, supra note 29.
98. See sources cited supra notes 96-97.
99. See sources cited supra notes 96-97.
100. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
101. Miller, The Embattled Arab Intellectuals, N.Y. Times, June 9, 1985, § 6 (Maga-
zine), at 6.
[Vol. 20:317
ISLAMIC LAW
thesis on Islamic government. 10 2 Islamic authorities banned his book,
burned available copies, revoked the author's degree, and threatened
him with execution as a heretic.10 3
Similarly, Ustadh Mahmoud Mohammed Taha, whose work is
central to the proposals in this Article, was executed in Khartoum on
January 18, 1985.0 4 The authorities burned his books and outlawed
his movement.10 5
VI. CONCLUSION
It is impossible to reconcile every aspect of public Shari'a as
developed by the early Muslim jurists with civil liberties and peaceful
international coexistence. Fortunately, to opt out of that version of
public Shari'a is not to opt out of Islam itself. On the contrary, to
insist on all aspects of historical public Shari'a today is tantamount to
saying that Islam stands for repression and discrimination at home
and aggression abroad.
In advocating international peaceful coexistence and respect for
human rights at home and abroad, one is fully aware of the many
problems Muslims have with these principles today. From the Mus-
lim third world perspective, there are problems with international law
and relations as defined and developed by western colonial powers.
From the Muslim cultural perspective, there are problems with human
rights as defined and developed by the western liberal tradition. Nev-
ertheless, in these same standards we already have a very good begin-
ning. Western dominance in both spheres has already been challenged
and eroded by contributions from socialist and third world coun-
tries. 10 6 The Muslims must overcome their historical biases in order
to participate and make their own original contributions to this pro-
cess. What they should not do is sit back and watch passively, as they
have been doing so far, or make the negative contribution of resur-
recting historical public Shari'a. International peace, justice, and
human rights have already been partially achieved through the Grace
of God, and are to be enhanced and promoted through His Grace too.
It is the paramount religious duty of all Muslims to participate in this
ultimate act of worship.
102. A. RAZIG, AL-ISLAM WA'USUL ALHUKM [Islam and the Basis of Government]
(1966).
103. AL-ISLAM WA 'UsuL AL HUKM 5 (M. Haqi ed. 1966); A. HouRANi, ARABIC
THOUGHT IN THE LIBERAL AGE 183-92 (1962); D. PIPES, supra note 11, at 122.
104. An-Na'in, Detention Without Trial in the Sudan: The Use and Abuse of Legal
Power, 17 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 159 (1986); Lesch, The Fall of Numieri, 1985 U.
FIELD STAFF INT'L REP. 22.
105. See sources cited supra note 104.
106. See sources cited supra notes 83 and 85.
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